Share accepting political violence as justified
Share of US adults agreeing that 'because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence to save our country' (PRRI / Chicago Project on Security & Threats wording).
Reading
Not predictive of any specific event. A measure of the political envelope inside which institutional responses to the diagnosis must operate.
Thresholds
- watch23 — above the PRRI/CPOST series average
- alarm30 — approaching the 2024 series peak
Context
Why this matters
The share of US adults agreeing that "because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence to save our country" — the standard PRRI / Chicago Project on Security & Threats (CPOST) question wording — is not predictive of any specific event. It is a measure of the political envelope inside which institutional responses to the diagnosis must operate. A reading in the 20–30% range does not mean that share of adults will commit political violence — it means roughly one in four sits in a population that has loosened its commitment to non-violent political resolution. The historical precedent: this number expands and contracts with political-cycle stress; it does not contract spontaneously.
Who watches this
- Robert Pape (Chicago Project on Security & Threats) — Director of CPOST at the University of Chicago; runs the longitudinal survey on this specific question since April 2021
- PRRI / Robert P. Jones — runs the parallel survey instrument with detailed cross-tabulation by political identity; publishes the canonical American Values Survey
- Rachel Kleinfeld (Carnegie Endowment) — comparative work on democratic-society political violence
- Barbara F. Walter (UC San Diego) — How Civil Wars Start places the US series in international comparative context
- Erica Chenoweth (Harvard) — researches the strategic logic of political violence vs. non-violent resistance
Recent history
The PRRI / CPOST series began in April 2021. Readings climbed through 2023–24, peaking near 30% in mid-2024 polling, then moderated back to ~20% on the January 2026 PRRI release (down from 23% in September 2025). Earlier reference points (the 2010s figures occasionally cited in commentary) are not from the same instrument and should be treated as separate measures rather than comparable history.
What would change my read
A sustained period without a triggering political-violence event combined with a sustained contraction in the survey share would suggest the envelope is narrowing. Historically that has required either an external unifying event or a perceived institutional reset (a contested election that resolved cleanly, a legislative coalition that delivered visible outcomes). The recent moderation to 20% is encouraging directionally but is one print, not a trend.