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US credit card revolving APR

Average APR on revolving credit-card balances (Fed G.19, TERMCBCCALLNS).

Current readingas of 2026-Q1
~22%
Position in historical range
12.5 (2014)med 14.522 (2026)

Reading

The structural transfer from the bottom half of the wealth distribution to the financial sector, in one number. The marginal household has no buffer — this is the cost of that fact.

Thresholds

  • watch22 household interest transfer exceeds prior cyclical peaks
  • alarm25 real terms approach the usury-territory floor

Context

Why this matters

The average APR on revolving credit-card balances measures the cost of household-level dollar funding for the marginal borrower. At 22%, it is the highest in the Fed G.19 series. With aggregate revolving balances at record levels, the implied annual interest transfer from the bottom half of the wealth distribution to the financial sector runs into the hundreds of billions of dollars. The number is the price tag attached to a population without buffers.

Who watches this

  • Federal Reserve G.19 team — publishes the source data quarterly
  • Ted Rossman (Bankrate) — most cited public commentator on credit-card APR data; produces the parallel Bankrate series
  • Adam Tooze (Columbia) — frames the household interest transfer in macro-political terms in his Chartbook newsletter
  • Daniela Gabor (SOAS, University of London) — academic-political work on the financialisation of household-credit channels
  • CFPB research team — institutional voice on credit-card market behaviour

Recent history

Revolving APR climbed from ~12.5% in 2014 (Fed G.19 TERMCBCCALLNS) to above 22% by 2024–25, driven by the post-2022 rate cycle and a structural margin expansion at issuing banks (the spread of card APRs over Fed funds is at the highest in the series). The level has held above 21% through the 2025 rate-cut cycle.

What would change my read

A sustained move below 18% would suggest the card-spread component is compressing — either through regulatory intervention or competitive pressure. The reverse — APRs climbing into the 24%+ band — would push the household interest transfer into territory historically associated with consumer-credit policy responses.